At the end of this week, the United Kingdom leaves the European Union.
I wanted to make a few points, given a lot of the noise around this event over the last few years.
Firstly, following the result of the referendum itself, the Tory election victories on pro-Brexit platforms in 2017 and 2019 (the latter with a very clear majority on a very clear platform), and UKIP victories at the last two EU elections, it must be clear that this is the majority will of the British people.
Whilst remainers have attempted to paint leavers in a particularly way, and whilst the details of the May and Johnson deals have muddied a lot of water, I have always felt that the main desires of those in favour of leave were clear:
- That the elected Westminster Parliament remain the apex law making body for the UK, and not the EU Parliament;
- That the UK’s judiciary and justice system not be subject to EU law;
- That the UK have control of its own borders (to be exercised as strictly or liberally as the UK Parliament desires);
- That the UK should no longer be subject to the common agricultural and fisheries policies;
- That the UK be free of EU commission regulations and standards (noting of course that by choice the UK has higher standards in some areas);
- That the UK be free to pursue its own trade policy (especially with Australia); and
- That any future risks of the UK being pressured to join the Euro, or an EU standing army, be over.
All of this will happen on 31 January, of course noting some complications and nuances in the transition, and existing judicial arrangements.
History was Never on Europe’s Side
But this has been coming for a long time, and has never been a quirky push by a crazy minority (even if, unfortunately, some crazy – and at times outright xenophobic – groups were along for the ride).
I would contend that the UK has never been truly comfortable in Europe.
The EU’s clear policy is for an “ever closer union”. This is not what the UK signed up to in 1973, and does not sit comfortably with the history of England or Scotland.
The UK’s history has been defined in terms of resistance to Europe: Agincourt, the Spanish Armada, and the Battle of Britain all stand large in the story of England. They are a part of the legend by which the British define themselves. Not the whole story, but a key aspect.
In 1534 Henry VIII completed what was arguably the First Brexit, with the departure of England from the Roman Catholic Church. The creation of the King of England as the “supreme governor” of the Church has language echoes with the Brexit of 2020, and a shared desire with modern Brexit for English law and sovereignty not to be subject to decrees from Europe.
Sit-coms including “Yes, Minister” (the Euro-sausage!) and “The New Statesman” actively lampooned the EU 30 and 40 years ago, and importantly cast Euro-ideals and Euro-attitudes as being at variance with those of Britain.
Even in every day language, the British always referred to “the continent”, to distinguish their island from mainland Europe.
The UK was never, I contend, comfortable in the EU, and a separation was frankly inevitable.
But Brexit should not be cast as isolationist. Indeed, it permits the UK a greater role in NATO and the Commonwealth, and allows the UK to expand rather than reduce its free trade relationships.
It is telling that in the 1990s when President Clinton made overtures to the UK to join NAFTA, John Major would have been keen to accept were it not for the EU’s restrictions; a desire for a greater and freer international engagement stifled by the EU.
The Path to Brexit
The idea that the Brexit referendum was a folly of David Cameron, or of the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative Party, also massively ignores the path UK politics took to the referendum, and the opportunities others had to take a different path.
In 2004 Tony Blair announced as policy a referendum on the UK signing on to the then-proposed EU Constitution. The Conservatives under Michael Howard supported this policy, so both major parties went to the 2005 election with promises of a referendum on any drafted EU constitution.
Every opinion poll in 2005 on this issue had the No vote winning. The constitution was shelved after both France and The Netherlands voted against it in their referendums.
The EU then brought much of the contents of this constitution forward as a re-branded Treaty of Lisbon. Indeed, a House of Commons research paper states that “the content of the treaty, though not its structure, is similar in a great many respects to the EU Constitution.”
The Opposition Conservative party under David Cameron was clear that their promise on the EU Constitution applied equally to the proposed Lisbon Treaty.
However, Labour – now led by Gordon Brown – signed the Treaty without a referendum.
The irony for Labour – and all remainers – is that had their promise been kept and a referendum held explicitly on whether the UK should sign up to the Lisbon Treaty, the 2016 “in-out” UK referendum would likely not have happened.
Indeed, a likely UK “No” would have followed the initial Irish “No” on Lisbon in 2008, and earlier rejections of the constitution by the French and Dutch. The combined effect may just have killed off Lisbon, and significantly slowed down the EU’s “ever closer union” policy, to the satisfaction of Britain.
Instead, Cameron and the Tories shifted their pledge to an “in-out” referendum on a re-negotiated EU deal for the UK.
This was put on hold by the LibDems in the coalition government of 2010-15, but remained a Tory election pledge in 2015; part of the platform on which Cameron won majority government. For Cameron not to then offer the vote would have been a breach of trust with the voters, and a failure to honour an election committment.
Once again, there is an irony that had the EU given Cameron some serious concessions in the re-negotiations, maybe – maybe – the Remain campaign would have won. Once again, EU stubbornness proved to be their own demise.
BUT!
Does anyone actually believe that had the 2016 referendum not happened, something between the EU and UK wouldn’t have snapped eventually?
In 1992 the acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty effectively destroyed John Major’s Government (and realistically would have presented similar unity challenges to a Kinnock Labour Gvt had they won the 1992 election). This is after the UK’s entry into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism played a part in ending Mrs Thatcher’s leadership (with the ERM then smashing the UK’s economy when they were forced out on Black Wednesday in 1992).
The UK (and Ireland) opted out of the Schengen Agreement (abolishing borders between EU member states) in 1997.
The UK (and Denmark) opted out of the Euro, confirming that decision finally in 2003.
The UK (along with Ireland and Denmark) also secured opt outs to the area of freedom, security and justice.
The UK negotiated significant concessions to various EU bail outs over the past 10-12 years.
Were the EU Constitution or the Treaty of Lisbon put to a referendum all evidence is that they would have failed.
Surely there can be no doubt that at some point the EU’s vision of an “ever closer union” and the UK’s resistance to that concept would have reached a breaking point in some form?
I remain convinced that were it not to have happened in 2016-2020, it would still have happened. Better then for the UK to get it done now, and indeed better for the EU for Brexit to have occurred as a specifically UK matter, and not as an event which may have brought about the collapse of a treaty.
Yes, the details have been difficult.
Yes, there have been isolationist and illiberal supporters of Brexit.
And yes, some of the Brexit details were toxically caught up in the ongoing battle for leadership of the conservative party (just witness the number of MPs who expressed un-nuanced resistance to Mrs May’s Deal, but equally un-nuanced support of Mr Johnson’s deal for evidence of this).
Yet the final result will fulfil the objectives I outlined at the start of this essay; objectives that I maintain are shared by the vast majority of “leavers”, and allow for a freer, more democratic, more liberal, and create a greater internationalist free-trading Britain.
Brexit is not a project of the hard right, and neither is it a project of Trumpist populism. Brexit is the logical continuation of the British liberal tradition of Pitt and Gladstone and Churchill.
Finally…
Finally, as someone who considers himself a democrat perhaps even more than I’d consider myself a liberal, I do have deep concern the view – often expressed over the last decade, both in the UK and Australia – which suggests that asking the people their views is – or was – a mistake, as the people may either get it wrong, or because free and open debate may be too difficult to handle.
Likewise I reject the contention that on Brexit specifically the people were deceived, or lacked the information. The intention of Brexit as I’ve outlined was always clear, the British people had a free and fair debate with all the information anyone could have wanted freely avaliable. The British people then voted for Brexit, and endorsed it again and again.
Perhaps these sentiments against democratic votes are the ultimate expression of the rhetorical elitism which finally made for leavers the prefect bogyman when campaigning against the EU?
The final irony.
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